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This paper examines the idea of ranking of groups and genders in terms of hiring probabilities.
By incorporating a range of complementary data sources, measures of the three possible gross
worker flows into employment, and the stocks of job seekers from which they come, are provided
for both genders in the Australian labour market. We find a clear ranking of men over women
in the hiring process. Indeed, in aggregate women appear to be effectively segregated from the
male hiring market, whereas this is not true with males in the female hiring market. We also find
that amongst males, employed job seekers are ranked above those unemployed and, in turn,
above those not in the labour force. For women, the unemployed and employed are not found to
be competing with each other, whilst those not in the labour force are ranked below the
unemployed. We believe that this is the first study explicitly investigating these three major gross
worker flows for women as well as men, enabling us to further explore the interdependent
processes in the labour market by considering more fully the interactions across job seekers of
different genders and from different labour market states.
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Introduction
When trying to explain the behaviour of the great aggregate stocks in the labour market the
traditional approach is to view these quantities as slow moving and sluggish. Indeed, the
persistence of high levels of unemployment has been identified as one of the problems of the
operation of the aggregate labour market in Australia in addition to a number of other OECD
countries (OECD, 1994). Concentration upon the level of these stocks, however, serves to hide
the dynamic behaviour which is taking place in the labour market. For example, there are three
possible sources of gross worker flows into employment: from unemployment to employment;
from job to job; and from not in the labour force (NLF) into employment. Whilst the level of
unemployment in December 1986 stood at 655,000 people, over the six months previous to that
date some 480,000 employees had become unemployed and 620,000 had left the state of
unemployment for a job. Similarly, during those six months there were 1.78 million occasions
of people moving from unemployment or outside of the labour force into employment and 1.64
million flows in the opposite direction, whilst the level of employment stood at 7 million. It has
recently become possible to examine the empirical issues related to the movements in Australia
using data on gross worker flows between labour market states published on a consistent basis
since 1979. The first few months of data were analyzed by Gregory (1982). We now have enough
observations to use this data in time series analysis and to examine the cyclical behaviour of the
gross flows.
Much analysis of the flows from unemployment into employment has already been
carried out (e.g., Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, Layard et al., 1991 and Burda and Wyplosz,
1994). There has been some work on the flow of those in jobs into new jobs and the possibility
of the unemployed facing competition from this group (Burgess, 1993, and Van Ours, 1995).
Mumford and Smith (1999) expand on this work by including the flow of those people NLF into
employment. However, none of these studies have considered the possible interaction of men and
women in the hiring process. Indeed, a major simplifying assumption made in the literature is
to concentrate exclusively on the flows of unemployed males. There are often practical reasons
for concentrating on males (usually dealing with  insufficiency of data on those not in the labour
force and the belief that this latter group is dominated by the behaviour of females who may face
different constraints eg., Pissarides, 1986, Layard et al, 1991, Burda and Wyplosz, 1994).
Nevertheless, given that females now constitute some 40% of the Australian labour force, it is
important to be able to include them.3
In this paper we incorporate  a range of complementary data sources to provide measures
of all three of these flows, and the stocks of job seekers from which they come, for both genders
in the Australian labour market. In section I, we discuss our data sources and the implications of
sampling limitations for our interpretation of the behaviour of the flows. In section II of the paper
we consider how the flows into unemployment react to the business cycle, thereby establishing
a series of stylized facts. We address the possibility of interactions across the flows into
employment and examine the idea of ranking of groups and genders in terms of hiring
probabilities in section III of the paper. In so doing, we will model hiring as dependent on a
matching function in the number of job seekers and the number of vacancies with search
effectiveness being allowed to vary across the gender of the seeker and across their initial labour
market state (employed, unemployed or not in the labour force). 
We are interested in whether or not there appears to be a fair share of jobs across these
applicant groups, where fair shares in hiring can be considered as the result of  random hiring
or no ranking. In other words, when non-ranking employers are faced with multiple applications
for a vacancy, they do not exhibit any consistent preference for a candidate from one pool of job
searchers than another (Blanchard and Diamond, 1995).  At the other end of the spectrum,
employers may exhibit full ranking whereby job seekers from one group will only have their
application considered if noone from the preferred group has applied for the vacancy. In between
these two extremes lays a range of hiring outcomes that reflect the preferences of employers who
are combining ranking and no-ranking elements when considering heterogenous applicants from
recognisable groups (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994;433). 
We concentrate on exploring the fair shares hypothesis in this paper. If there is no ranking
in the hiring process, estimates of the shares of the component stocks of total searchers across
the three share equations will be the same (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989;34). We also compare
the results from our hiring function regressions with the stylized facts in section III and find that
they are consistent in most cases. Conclusions and suggested avenues for future work are
presented in the final section of the paper.
We believe that this is the first study explicitly investigating the three major gross worker
flows for women as well as men, enabling us to further explore the interdependent processes in
the labour market by considering more fully the interactions across job seekers of different4
1The core data used in this section are currently published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics as Table 33.
Estimates of Labour Force Status and Gross Changes (Flows) Derived From Matched Records in The Labour Force
Australia, 6203.0.  Some additional unpublished data were provided by the ABS. Unemployment stock data come
from The Labour Force Australia.
genders and from different labour market states. 
I. The nature of the gross worker flows data
a) The gross flows data
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (the ABS) has published data on gross worker flows on an
almost continuous basis since late 1979.
1 The data are derived from the Labour Force Survey of
households and, in particular, the matched records of successive monthly surveys. The ABS
surveys a sample of some 30,000 individual private and non-private dwellings each month. On
the basis of this survey, each individual is assigned a labour market state for the week previous
to the survey. The ABS then constructs estimates of the stocks of those employed, unemployed
and not in the labour force.  The construction of matched records between months is used to
create flow data. The quality of these data is affected by a number of factors. First, each month
one eighth of the sample is replaced and no matching of records of those affected is possible.
Second, it is not possible for the ABS to match the records of those surveyed in non-private
dwellings such as hotels, hospitals and other institutions. Third, there are the familiar problems
of non-response and failure to match records of some who move location, etc. The net result is
that only about 80% of survey responses are matched.
An indication of the likely effects of both the missing data problem and the classification
error problem can be judged from the results presented by Abowd and Zellner (1985) and Poterba
and Summers (1986) on US data.  The Current Population Survey (CPS) data that they used is
very similar in character to the ABS data used here.  The matched records consist of some 75 per
cent of the total survey who are interviewed on consecutive months, less 7.5 percent of those
present in one month and missing in the second and a further 7.5 percent missing in the initial
month and present in the second.  Abowd and Zellner, and Poterba and Summers are able to use
two additional pieces of information to adjust the raw flows data.  First, they have information
on the declared labour market state of those classified as missing in either the first or second
month, which allows them to allocate missing data to the unadjusted flow series. The broad
outcome of Abowd and Zellner's analysis is to make average adjustments to the gross flows of
between -12 to 15 percent, due to the missing data problem.  Second, they have re-interview data5
2The interruption of this survey has informed the choice of our data period.
on a subset of the total survey to analyze the problem of classification error. This re-interview
data asked further questions of some interviewees concerning current labour market status.  The
responses were then compared with the original data and used to adjust the raw flows data. (It
appears that these adjustments were mostly to the status reported by those who described
themselves as being not in the labour force.)  Abowd and Zellner made average adjustments of
between 8 and 49 percent as a result of excluding spurious labour market transitions due to
misclassifications.
The size of these adjustments suggests caution when interpreting results using the ABS
data, since adjustments of the Abowd and Zellner type are not possible due to the absence of
information on the missing data or classification error.  In what follows we assume that any
missing data is distributed randomly across flow types, in the absence of any additional
information.  Where the results of Abowd and Zellner suggest that problems may arise, these will
be discussed below.
b) Job to job flows.
The one important flow not covered by the gross flows data is that between jobs. As there is no
change in labour market status in going from one job to another, the LFS fails to pick up
movements across jobs between interviews. Evidence for a number of countries suggests that
such flows are substantial  (OECD 1994) and that on average these flows are around 10% of
employment (Davis et al, 1996). Here we estimate the size of these flows from the annual LFS
survey question which covers current job duration for those currently employed excluding those
who had no previous job in the year
2. Assuming that the duration of such jobs is replicated across
the year we obtain a rate of job to job movements over a year. This annual rate is then
interpolated into a quarterly rate and, with the use of the quarterly employment stock data, a
quarterly flow is obtained. This is clearly an approximate method for calculating this important
flow, however, we feel that it is superior to alternatives in the literature. (For example,
Blanchard and Diamond (1991) apply a proportion of the quit rate in US manufacturing to the
total employment stock to obtain a job to job flow for the whole economy.) 
We  treat all jobs equivalently in this study regardless of whether or not they are part-6
time. This is because we are interested in the probability of being hired for a  job searcher. We
do not know what people’s preferences are over the hours they work nor do we believe that
seekers all prefer full-time employment. Nevertheless, we recognize that the growth  in part-time
employment in the Australian labour market may represent a rise in underemployment and that
this is an obvious avenue for future research.
c) Long-term unemployed.
We also consider the possible role of the proportion of long-term unemployed as a potential
determinant of the hiring rate. We define the long-term unemployed to be those unemployed for
more than 12 months in their current spell. The arguments presented in Budd et al (1988) and
rehearsed in more detail in chapter 7 of Layard et al (1991) suggest that the proportion of
long-term unemployed in the total would have a negative effect on the hiring rate. This is
because this proportion indicates the relative size of a group of unemployed persons whose
outflow probability from unemployment is significantly lower than others because of  the length
of time that they have been unemployed for. The explanations for this outcome can be grouped
under two headings; decreasing effectiveness of the unemployed to search out new jobs, and
increasing choosiness of employers. The first could come from the demoralization of the longer
term unemployed and the effects of longer duration of unemployment on the quality of workers
skills and motivation to search for jobs. The second from employer perception of the quality of
unemployed workers and, in particular, a negative view of the job skills of the longer term
unemployed. A concurrent theme in the literature concerning the search effectiveness of the long
term unemployment deals with changes in the relative quality of the unemployed (i.e.,
heterogeneity). For example, in a recession a large inflow of people into unemployment implies
that there will be a greater variance in the  quality of long term unemployed people. Alternatively,
in a boom  most of the good quality unemployed will have been hired leaving a comparatively
disproportionately large number of bad quality people amongst the remaining long term
unemployed. In response to the business cycle, this heterogeneity effect will work in the opposite
direction to that typically expected from state dependence. Direct evidence on these issues is not
generally available, however, we expect to find a lower search effectiveness from the long term
unemployed in our empirical analysis.
d) Not in the labour force.
Whilst the states of unemployment and employment are clearly established by official definition,7
3The relative number of marginally attached women far exceeds that of men. In 1991 there was about twice as many
women marginally attached women as unemployed, whereas there was about twice as many males unemployed
as there was marginally attached. 
4Some of the marginally attached are not currently actively searching because they are physically unable to work.
We exclude them from our measure of NLF job seekers. We concentrate on those who are actively looking for work
but are unable to start work within seven days and those who want a job but are not actively looking and are
classified as discouraged job seekers, as those groups with characteristics which make them job seekers.
there is a major definitional issue concerning those defined to be not in the labour force. As we
will be modeling outflows from outside of the labour force it is important that we have a good
measure of those in that state and looking for work. By contrast, there are strict availability and
job search requirements that must be fulfilled in order for an individual who is out of work to be
classified as unemployed by the ABS. In particular, it is required that the person concerned
should want to work, be currently actively looking for work and be available to start work within
seven days of the interview. This constitutes availability for work and active job search.
Satisfying these criteria is also required by the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) for
those registering for unemployment benefits. However, the ABS/CES definition of the number
of unemployed may well exclude a number of potential workers who happen not to exactly
satisfy the criteria, but who we may wish to include in a wider definition of job seekers and, in
particular, regard as the group of NLF seeking work. 
In the group of non-workers which is classified by the ABS as not in the labour force,
there is an identified group of people who want to work and are either  actively looking for work
but unavailable to start work immediately (within seven days) or  not currently actively looking
for work but who want to work and are able to start work within four weeks. This group is
classified by the ABS as marginally attached to the labour force.
3 This group would appear to
have search attributes which (although not satisfying the official descriptions of active searching
and available for work) could be considered to make them job seekers under a wider definition
4.
We will use this group as our measure of the stock of job seekers.
As discussed earlier, the precision of the estimates of outflow rates from not in the labour
force are particularly affected by the measurement error in the flows data identified by Abowd
and Zellner (1985). In part this is because the stock measure of those NLF from the gross flows
data is calculated as the residual after the employed and unemployed have been identified and
includes those in institutions. This is not true for our measure of the marginally attached. We8
5The model for the maximum likelihood estimates of the Markov-switching model for real GDP growth is: ￿yt =
￿0 + ￿1st + ut  and ￿(L)ut = et  where ￿yt is quarterly change in log GDP (times 100), st is a latent dummy variable
equalling 1 or 0, and ￿(L) is a fourth-order autoregression. The transitions between high growth states (st=1) and
low growth states (st=0) are governed by the probabilities: P(st = 1 ￿ st-1 = 1) = p and P(st = 0 ￿ st-1 = 0) = q. Results
are ￿0 = -0.08 (0.45),  ￿1=  1.19 (0.21), p=0.92 (0.10), q=0.71 (0.16), ￿1=-0.14 (0.12), ￿2=-0.08 (0.10),  ￿3=0.11
(0.10), ￿4=-0.13 (0.10), where standard errors are in parentheses.  Log-likelihood: -94.77. Sample period: 1978q1 -
1991q4.
expect, therefore, that our use of the marginally attached as the relevant stock of searchers
mitigates the impact of this measurement error on our estimates.
II. Gross flows and the business cycle
Next, we develop some stylised facts about the cyclical behaviour of hiring rates. It has been
widely documented that the response of the labour market to business cycle shocks is asymmetric
across the business cycle. We examine this idea by presenting the response of each of the hiring
rates to the business cycle indicator generated by the shifting regime model of Hamilton (1989)
(see also Acemoglu and Scott (1994)
5. Estimates of the equations for the five outflow equations
are given in Table 1. In each case we estimate the impact of the state of the business cycle (as
generated by the Markov-switching model) on the outflow rate whilst including some dynamics
of adjustment. Each of the equations is well-determined with little evidence of misspecification.
The precision of the estimates of the 1’s for each outflow rate shows the significance of the state
of the business cycle for all outflow rates into jobs. Next, we present calculations for the
percentage increases (decreases) in the outflow rate, or hazard, associated with a high (low) state
relative to their average rates based on the estimates in Table 1. More specifically, they are the
deviation from the mean values of each of the flows resulting from a cyclical up or downturn.
These results are given in Table 2.  It seems that the three flow rates for both genders actually
respond in quite different ways to the business cycle, although the asymmetry of behavior in high
and low growth states is common to all. 
Comparing across the gender groups, we can see that the relative swings in all three of
the female flows across cyclical upturns and downturns are similar. This is not true for men; the
swing in the movement from job to job flows is more than four times greater than the change in
the NLF outflow. Male hiring from unemployment responds slightly less than that for females
in upturns, whilst the fall off in hiring for this group in downturns is substantially larger for males
than females. In contrast, the movement between jobs is affected much more for males than
females in upturns and somewhat less in downturns. Finally, flows from NLF are much more9
sensitive to the cycle for women than men. This summary of the cyclical behavior of the flows
provides us with some stylized facts to be explored using a model of the hiring process.
III. The hiring function
The hiring function captures the possibility of a job seeker successfully leaving the pool of
unemployed. In its simplest form  (Budd et al, 1988, and Jackman et al, 1991), the hiring
function  says that the inflow rate into employment from unemployment is determined by the
ratio of the stock of job searchers to the stock of vacancies. The process can be thought of in
much the same way as that of a firm producing goods. Just as the firm requires inputs of capital
(machines) and labour (workers) to produce output (of goods), the labour market uses the stock
of available jobs (vacancies) and willing would-be-workers (job searchers) to produce matches
(hires of workers to jobs). The hiring function for the sum of men and women can be written as:
Mt = f (St , Vt ) (1)
where the flow of new job matches or hires (Mt) over period t is produced from a function of the
number of available job seekers (St) and number of vacancies (V t) at the start of the period.
Extensive empirical work in the United States (Blanchard and Diamond, 1990) and the UK and
other European countries (Burda and Wyplosz, 1994, and Burgess, 1993, amongst others) have






where the  is a scale parameter capturing changes in the efficiency of the matching process (that
would impact on all searchers equally). Implicit in this type of functional form is the assumption
that an equiproportional increase in searchers and in vacancies will generate an equiproportionate
increase in hires (an apparently reasonable assumption in a large market, Layard et al, 1994).
Furthermore, when incorporated into a general equilibrium model, the matching function is
required to exhibit constant returns-to-scale for there to be a balanced growth path for the
economy (Pissarides, 1990). 
Looking at the general matching function (1) in more detail, we can think of it as
constructed from the following components. The total number of matches (Mt) is the sum of hires
from employment or job to job flows (Jt), hires from unemployment (Xt) and hires from outside
of the labour force (Lt). So:
Mt = Jt + Xt + Lt (3)
The sum of the stocks that produce these new job matches is the total number of job searchers10
6If   then all current job seekers have equal effectiveness. ˜ StSt
7An alternative approach is to make ￿(Et) a function of total matches and unemployment as in Burgess (1993). In
Mumford and Smith (1999) we find that our approach dominates for aggregated male and female data.
(St) which is the sum of unemployed job searchers (Ut), out-of-the labour force job searchers (Nt)
and employed job searchers (EJS). There is no direct measure of the number of employed job
searchers, we therefore approximate this stock with (Et) which is a function  of the current
stock of employed persons (Et). So:
St = (Et) + Ut + Nt (4)
This equation implies that all searchers have an equal relative chance of being hired regardless
of their labour market status (in other words, they are perfect substitutes for each other in the
hiring process). Obviously, this equal shares rule may not be true and indeed we would expect
it not to be. It may be that the component groups of the total number of job searchers actually
have differing search effectiveness for a given set of job vacancies. For example, the search
effectiveness of each group may be a function of its reservation wage which may differ across
labour market states  (Mortensen, 1986,  Layard et al, 1991;234). Also, we would expect that it
may be influenced by a range of personal characteristics such as the duration of unemployment
for the unemployed job seeker (Budd et al., 1988, and Blanchard and Diamond, 1994).
Thus, the true measure of effective job searchers may be:
(4') ˜ St(Et)suUsnN
where s u and s n measure the search effectiveness of the unemployed and NLF job searchers
relative to the employed job searchers, and the search effectiveness of the later group (the EJS)
is normalized to unity (in other words, we are measuring search effectiveness relative to this
group)
6. Furthermore, we assume that s n is a constant and s u is decreasing in the proportion of
the unemployed who are long-term unemployed. In our empirical work we measure    directly St
for the number of unemployed and not-in-the-labour force job seekers. This leaves us to model
the function (Et) for employed job seekers. We assume that the main determinant of the decision
to search as an employed person is the success of such job seekers in finding a new job in the
previous period
7, thus we make employed search an explicit function (Et) = Jt-1.  
If all job vacancies are equally available to seekers subject to search effectiveness, we11
8For the simple case, aggregating males and females, the Taylor series approximation provides:
 log(Ut￿Nt￿￿Et)￿constant￿logUt￿ ¯ N/( ¯ U￿ ¯ N￿￿ ¯ E)log(Nt/Ut)￿￿ ¯ E/( ¯ U￿ ¯ N￿￿ ¯ E)log(￿Et/Ut)
would expect that job seekers from any given group would receive a share of offers proportional
to their share among the total number of job searchers.
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Consider, for example, then the determination of the hiring of unemployed females,X
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t Mt/ ˜ St
Our premise here is that there is a general pool of vacancies, that there is a predetermined total
number of matches whose determination we do not analyze, and that the matching process
operates in such a way that the outcome may result in potentially unequal hiring rates across
searchers from different labour market groups. Thus, we are conditioning on the total number of
matches but allowing the data to identify the search effectiveness of each group of job seekers.
We proceed as follows. First, we rearrange equation (6) in terms of the outflow rate of
females from, in this case, unemployment and take logs to give:




t )logMtlog( ˜ St)
To test equation (7) in log-linear form we employ a Taylor series approximation
8 and estimate

































Analogous expressions can be derived for hires from outside the labour force and from
employment, for men and women respectively. 
We would expect, given the discussion above, that  1=1 throughout implying all12
equations are for a share of  total matches. The adding up restriction this implies dictates that we
present results for five out of the six flow-share equations. (Given that inflows into employment
are expressed as shares of total hires, one of the equations in the set is determined a priori. Under
this restriction, the covariance matrix for the system of six equations will be singular.
Consequently, given the existence of stock data for unemployed and NLF job searchers, we
choose to rely on the five equations presented.) The remaining coefficients (2 through 8) should
reflect the importance of each of the relevant groups of searchers among the total pool of
searchers (subject to the log-linearisation). In addition, if there is no ranking in the hiring process,
the search effectiveness (implied by our estimates) of each group of  job seekers should be
identical across outflow rate equations (again, subject to the  log-linearisation). Evidence to the
contrary would be indicative of ranking in the hiring process. This is not to say that any one
equation will capture the true relative differences in search effectiveness. It is not possible in
practice to separate the demand and supply effects sufficiently to be able to distinguish between
the impacts of search effort and the aggregate offer arrival rate for each group. However,
differences across equations are indicative of hiring probabilities varying by job type and we
interpret this as ranking in outcomes.
IV. Results
We have estimated each of the outflow equations on quarterly data over the period 1980q4 to
1991q4, this time period is restricted by our reliance on some unpublished data and the
interruption of surveys upon which our data construction relies. Nevertheless, the length of the
estimation period covers two major recessions and one extended period of expansion in the
Australian labour market. Estimates of our preferred models are given in Table 3. These
equations were all estimated by Ordinary Least Squares and include seasonal dummy variables
as well as a constant. In general the estimates are well-determined and there is no strong evidence
of model misspecification.
In each case our estimation has begun with unrestricted estimation of versions of equation
(8). The restriction on that equation that 1=1 (i.e., that the dependent variable be the outflow rate
relative to total hires) is not rejected for all cases. A consequence of this restriction is that the full
set of six equations would be singular and so it is possible to only look at five out of six relative
flows. Therefore we drop the job-to-job flow equations for males.13
9Those unemployed for more than 12 months in their current spell. Although we do not focus on this issue in this
paper, the negative coefficient on the male long term unemployed ratio only suggests that longer duration male
unemployed have a lower outflow probability. We find no evidence of this for females.
10As discussed earlier, the number of marginally attached females is roughly double the number of unemployed
females. Thus, whilst unemployed females are apparently preferred in the hiring process, the weight of the numbers
results in more women from NLF being hired.
A more critical set of restrictions are those for the exclusion of various stocks of
competing job searchers. In each case this set of exclusion restrictions is also not rejected. We
give the relevant test statistic as the last line (z5) in Table 3. The modeling of section III
summarized in equation (8) suggests that the coefficients on the own-gender stock of job
searchers associated with each individual flow should be equal to minus one. Estimates of these
coefficients are given in the first row of Table 3. In general, they are close to one but there is
evidence that outflows from NLF are sensitive to the stock of marginally attached perhaps
suggesting some segmentation of the market for this group, both male and female. 
The estimates in column 1 of  Table 3 show that the important components of the stock
of job searchers for unemployed male job seekers are (i) the other unemployed males, (ii)
employed males, and (iii) the long-term male unemployment ratio
9. Those job seekers who are
(i) not in the labour force males, and (ii) all of the females do not provide effective competition
for jobs for the male unemployed. Similarly, none of the female stocks are found to significantly
impact on the hiring of males from outside of the labour force. Comparison of these results
suggest a clear ranking for males over females in the hiring process, furthermore, males in jobs
are ranked above those unemployed, as the unemployed are above those not-in-the labour market.
The interpretation of the results for women is much more complex. From column 2 of
Table 3 we see that the hiring of unemployed females is only significantly affected by the
numbers of male unemployed. The flow of women between jobs is negatively affected by all of
the male stocks and by the stock of employed female job seekers. The flow from NLF females
into jobs falls with more female unemployment, more females who are NLF, and with more
employed male job searchers. These results do not suggest that females are preferred to males
in the hiring process since all the female flows are significantly affected by at least one male
flow. There is also not a full ranking across the female applicants: the employed and unemployed
job seekers appear to be essentially independent of each other, whilst the NLF face significant
competition from unemployed females
10.14
The construction of equation (8) shows that the coefficients on competing stocks are
average proportions of this group of searchers in the total pool of searchers relevant to the
particular outflow. In the case of fair shares we would expect these proportions to be the same
across all five equations. The alternative restrictions referred to above demonstrate that fair
shares can be rejected. As a consequence of this, and the deviation of the own stock coefficients
from one, interpretation of the coefficient sizes is hazardous. We can say, however, that larger
coefficient values on individual competing stocks of job seekers means they are more numerous
in the stock of searchers relevant to the particular flow. Employed male job seekers are a
substantial proportion of competing job seekers according to the estimates in all five columns
of the table. The male unemployed are generally significant but less important as a proportion:
all of the coefficients on this stock are smaller than those for employed males.
These hiring function results for men and women are consistent with many but not all of
the relative cyclical behavior of flow rates presented in Table 1. For males, in upturns the greater
cyclical sensitivity in flows into employment from those in jobs over those from unemployment
and not-in-the-labour force is consistent with the ranking of these groups in Table 2. In
downturns, flows from NLF are relatively unaffected, however, suggesting that some form of
market segmentation may be playing a role. The relative cyclical behavior of female flows is
similar for flows from each state. The lack of a direct ranking result for women from the hiring
functions is consistent with this absence of significant differences in cyclical behavior.
Interestingly, there is one significant positive coefficient on a stock of searchers amongst
our hiring rate estimates.  An increase in male unemployment actually increases the flow of the
female NLF into jobs. In the context of the hiring function, where an increase in the number of
other job searchers would typically represent an increase in competition for vacancies, this is an
a priori perverse result: we know from Table 2 that the total flow of NLF females into
employment is strongly procyclical, therefore, the negative effects from the other stocks
impacting on this flow should be larger in a downturn than the positive effect from the male
unemployed. Indeed, this is the case. The very cyclically sensitive female NLF stock is having
a major impact on the flow. Whilst the positive effect of male unemployment stock may be
outweighed in the aggregate, it is nevertheless an important finding. It suggests that there may
be a substitution effect taking place: as male unemployment rises more women from NLF are
finding jobs. Whilst this substitution effect has not been found in the hiring function literature15
before, there are a range of possible explanations within labour economics. For example, a
positive cross-wage elasticity between a wife’s  labour supply and her husband’s earnings has
been well established in the labour supply literature (Killingsworth, 1986;137). Similarly, if  the
value of non-market work time for the NLF female job seekers is indeed negatively affected by
a rise in male unemployment, the positive coefficient is also consistent with the search theoretic
model due to a  corresponding fall in the female reservation wage, an increase in the search effort
of the female and/or a more binding liquidity constraint (Mortensen 1986;859-871).
IV.  Conclusions.
In contrast to the fair shares rule common to the hiring function literature, we find a clear
ranking of men over women in the hiring process, indeed in aggregate women appear to be
effectively segregated from the male hiring market, whereas this is not true with males in the
female hiring market. We also find that amongst the males, employed job seekers are ranked
above those unemployed and, in turn, those not in the labour force. For women, we find that the
unemployed and employed are not competing with each other, whilst those not in the labour force
are ranked below the unemployed. The lack of a clear ranking amongst female job seekers from
different labour market states is in accordance with the similar responses of their flows to the
business cycle.
These results may appear to be counterintuitive given that over the expansionary period
of the 1980s, employment of females rose relative to that of males. However, the relative hiring
rate of females when defined as a proportion of the stock of searchers stayed constant and when
defined as a proportion of the stock of employees actually fell. These two facts can be reconciled
by observing that outflows of males from employment over this period also rose relative to those
of females. In this paper we have analyzed hiring, job separations (and the implied increase in
this for males) is an important area for future research. 
The hiring function approach, suitably disaggregated, has made the relative position of
male job seekers quite clear. For females, whilst it has revealed important interactions, the
approach has demonstrated the need for further analysis, probably at the individual level, to
explore the importance of the revealed substitution and segmentation effects. 
Furthermore, in this paper we have sought to identify differences in hiring outcomes, we16
have not attempted an explanation of why job seekers from different labour market states and
different gender groups might have different hiring rates. The fundamental issue of why search
effectiveness may differ across these groups remains unanswered - this is the obvious avenue for
future research in this area.17
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      Table 1.  Estimates of the Cyclical Behaviour of Employment Inflows                                                                              
Male Female







































0.78 0.75 0.8 0.69 0.78 0.86 ¯ R
2
s.e. 0.0649 0.0184 0.071 0.0649 0.0206 0.055
z1 8.91 6.04 6.82 7.01 2.53 8.01
z2 1.09 0.03 0.5 0.02 0.81 1.09
z3 4.64 47.96* 0.63 0.05 28.7* 0.01
z4 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.96
t-values in parentheses; z1: Lagrange Multiplier test for up to 4th order autocorrelation distributed 
2(4); z2: Reset test for incorrect functional form distributed 
2(1);
z3: Jarque-Bera test for normality distributed  
2(2); z4: test for heteroscedasticity distributed  
2(1).
Model (e, unemployment): log(Xt/Ut￿1)01t1log(Xt￿1/Ut￿2)2log(Xt￿2/Ut￿3)
where Xt : hires from unemployment over period t; Ut : stock of unemployed at end of period t-1;  t-1 = Et-1St-1 : the state of the business cycles in period t-1,
according to the Markov switching model estimates.20
Table 2. Cyclical responses of Employment Inflows.
                                                                                                                
Outflow rate from: Output growth state Male Female
                                                                                                                
Unemployment High +11.8% +12.5%
Low -61.4% -46.5%
Difference 73.2 59.0
Employment High +60.4% +11.8%
Low -34.4% -47.5%
Difference 94.8 59.3
Not in the Labour Force High +4.7% +18.3%
Low -16.3% -52.7%
Difference 21 71
                                                                                                               
In the high growth state GDP rises by 4.76% per annum, during low growth it falls by 0.32% per annum.
 
The values in this table are calculated as follows. The equilibrium or long-run solution of 
equation (A1) is :  log(X/U)0/(11)1/(11).
For =1 (an upturn), the average value of  log(X/U)(01)/(11)
and for  =0 (a downturn), the average value of  log(X/U)0/(11)
    21
Table 3: Outflow Rates into Employment                                               
1.  own outflow rate from unemployment 2. own outflow rate from not in labour force 3. own outflow rate from jobs
Male Femal
e
Male Female      Female








   own employed job searchers -0.86
(-13.31)




   other employed job searchers -0.32
(-3.42)




    female unemployment -0.43
(-3.75)
   male unemployment -0.09
(-5.10)
    male long term unemployed -0.17
(-4.54)




   male not in the labour force -0.20
(-3.92)
     0.92 0.74     0.92 0.91 0.97 ¯ R
2
    se 0.0445 0.048     0.0467 0.028    0.0219
    z1 6.76 3.97     9.79* 9.44     5.09
    z2 0.59 3.6     0.83 4.82*    0.27
    z3 0.75 14.91*    1.07 0.6    1.78
    z4 0.65 3.38    0.9 1.17    0.01












   0.74

2(2)
t-values in parentheses.  Each outflow rate is in logs of the (outflow divided by own gender dependent variable stock).  Estimation period: 1980q4 - 1991q4.  Equations
include a constant, seasonal dummy variables and the restriction that logMt=1.  Methods of estimation OLS.   z1: Lagrange Multiplier test for up to 4th order
autocorrelation distributed 
2(4); z2:  Reset test for incorrect functional form distributed 
2(1);  z3: Jarque-Bera test for normality distributed 
2(2); z4: test for
heteroscedasticity distributed 
2(1); z5: joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficient of the deleted variables (LM) distributed 
2 with relevant degrees of freedom
in parentheses in the row below. 